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 Abstract 
Developments in regional financing arrangements, such as the strengthening of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative in East Asia, and the increased lending in the global financial crisis are 
increasingly raising questions about their contribution to the stability of the international 
financial system, and their relation to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its role 
in safeguarding that stability. Key questions concern the implications of regional financing 
arrangements for the lending and surveillance functions of the IMF and whether they 
could come to supplant Fund financing. Indeed, emerging market interest in regional 
financing arrangements may be attributed to perceptions of an undue burden of 
conditionality attached to IMF lending, and the dissatisfaction expressed by larger, 
dynamic emerging market economies over their lack of influence in the Fund’s decision-
making, as evident in their calls for representation commensurate with their economic 
significance. This issue has not yet been squarely addressed, and this paper seeks to fill 
that gap. It explores the argument that the contribution of regional financing arrangements 
to the stability of the international monetary and financial system depends on their design 
and operation. To gauge the quality of a regional financing arrangement, we establish a set 
of critical factors – “optimal financing criteria” – relevant for providing crisis financing, 
using a first principles approach. We then evaluate the frameworks for the IMF and the 
various regional arrangements in existence against these criteria. Results suggest that the 
design and operation of regional arrangements determine whether the extent to which they 
help alleviate crises. In essence, we find that those in existence can be expected to have 
superior information about the economy in crisis, and react more quickly to address a 
situation, but may lack the expertise to define the policy course towards external 
sustainability and the amount of funding necessary to reassure markets. 
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1  Introduction 
“Developing countries […] would go their own way […]. We will seek self insur-
ance by building up high levels of international reserves, and we will participate in 
regional reserve-sharing pools and regional monetary institutions. The fragmenta-
tion of the multilateral financial system, which is already emerging, will accelerate.” 
(Statement to the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee by Guido 
Mantega, Minister of Finance of Brazil, Washington DC, 20 Oct. 2007) 
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) handling of various financial crises over the past 
decade has given rise to a barrage of criticism. The Fund stands accused of providing un-
helpful, even counterproductive advice (as in the Argentine and Asian crises); of being late 
to react (the Brazilian crisis); of providing insufficient finance to stabilise a situation and 
calm markets (the Asian crisis); of not identifying a looming crisis in time (the US sub-
prime crisis); and of attaching excessive microeconomic requirements to its loans.1 This 
led, in some cases, to a sense of humiliation in some afflicted countries as leaders perceived 
themselves forced to swallow bitter IMF medicine. To address their dissatisfaction with 
the Fund’s crisis financing, attempts have been made to bolster first and second lines of 
defence – foreign exchange reserves and regional financing arrangements, respectively. 
In the wake of these crises, countries have recovered, learned from their mistakes, and 
gained strength and stature in the world economy. Due to a combination of prudent eco-
nomic management and a long period of benign global monetary conditions that lasted 
until summer 2008, many countries have succeeded in building up large foreign exchange 
reserves, which can serve as a first line of defence in the event of a crisis. Others, such as 
East Asia, have gone further and developed regional financing arrangements (RFAs) that 
are becoming ever more sophisticated, in effect, strengthening a second line of defence. 
In this paper, we define an RFA as an arrangement within which a group of countries 
pledges financial support to other members of that group that are experiencing balance of 
payment problems, either through a pool of contributed or borrowed reserves or through 
the swap of financial assets (usually foreign exchange reserves). 
As emerging market economies (EMEs) rise up the ranks of economically important coun-
tries, the attractiveness of regional financing arrangements, not merely as a complement to 
IMF financing, but potentially as a substitute for IMF financing, has become intertwined 
with the issue of representation of EMEs in the Fund’s decision making processes. EMEs 
are seeking a greater voice in IMF governance in order to influence IMF policies. The 
Brazilian Finance Minister’s remarks made at the October 2007 Annual Meetings of the 
IMF quoted above made clear the demand of EMEs for a greater say in the governance of 
the IMF, and the role that RFAs could play in the future if IMF governance reforms are 
not deemed satisfactory by EMEs. 
These developments give rise to a number of issues concerning the future and integrity of 
IMF crisis lending, one of the IMF’s key roles. The overarching question is whether re-
gional arrangements will supplement or supplant IMF lending to a country with a balance 
of payments crisis. Will RFAs augment Fund financing by making larger sums available 
for disbursement? Or will they enable countries in balance of payments crises to bypass 
the Fund entirely? If the answer is yes, do they provide a healthy dose of competition for 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, the contributions in Vines / Gilbert (2004). 
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the Fund in the provision of crisis financing, or do they have the potential to undermine 
the very stability of the international monetary system by undercutting Fund conditionality 
with an insufficiently rigorous economic management and lax lending requirements, 
which leave open the risk of crisis exacerbation and contagion. Could they lead to a weak-
ening of economic policy making standards through conditionality shopping? Such ques-
tions addressing the roles of RFAs and their relation with the Fund have become even 
more important in the face of recent discussions about the creation of a European Mone-
tary Fund as a reaction to the Greek debt crisis (e.g. Schäuble 2010; Gros / Meyer 2010; 
Suominen 2010). 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate these questions and examine the extent to which 
the RFAs currently in existence are likely to complement or substitute IMF crisis lending. 
To this end, we develop criteria for optimal RFAs and evaluate existing RFAs, as well as 
the IMF, according to these criteria. Based on our results we consider the implications of 
RFAs for international monetary stability and evaluate ramifications for the IMF. The pa-
per stops short of discussing the consequences for the existence of the Fund which is a 
subject rich enough for a separate paper. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we consider criteria for 
optimal financing arrangements and apply these to the IMF. In Section 3 we subsequently 
examine the performance of various RFAs as regards these criteria. Section 4 discusses 
the impact of RFAs on international monetary stability and the consequences for IMF cri-
sis lending. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Criteria for optimal financing arrangements and the benchmark IMF case 
2.1  Insights for optimal financing arrangements 
Take the hypothetical case of a country (A) that is facing an impending balance of pay-
ments crisis, but may make recourse to a financing arrangement, such as the IMF or a re-
gional arrangement. On the one hand, it is important for country A that it is provided with 
sufficient financial resources to service its international obligations and restore confidence 
with its creditors; and that these funds are provided soon enough to prevent a worsening of 
the situation. On the other hand, the providers of crisis financing need a reliable estimate 
of the country’s financing needs (which presumes timely access to relevant and reliable 
information, as well as the necessary analytical skills for its evaluation) and to ensure that 
the country repays the loan in order to safeguard the resources for further use. This implies 
having effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of agreed conditionality. 
From these considerations, six features can be identified that are of particular importance 
to RFAs in providing effective crisis financing: (i) the size of the financing pool or re-
sources accessible; (ii) timely access to relevant information; (iii) high quality analytical 
expertise; (iv) speed in decision-making; (v) impartiality in lending decisions; and (vi) 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing conditionality. We discuss each criterion in turn 
and evaluate the IMF’s abilities as a crisis manager and lender according to these criteria 
as a benchmark case. Subsequently, section 3 examines how well existing RFAs meet 
these conditions. 
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(i) Magnitude of the available finance 
First of all, for any lending arrangement to be relevant, it needs to be endowed with suffi-
cient financial resources to provide credit in adequate amounts to countries on the brink of 
crisis. The optimal size of resources depends on the characteristics of the financing ar-
rangement’s membership and the likely constellation of drawers.2 The susceptibility of 
members of a financing arrangement to crisis, and the amounts of emergency credit that 
might then be needed are a function of several factors. These include: a country’s short 
term external (foreign currency) debt relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP); its ability 
to generate foreign exchange through exports; the amount of liquid international reserves 
held by the government or central bank; its ability to borrow and mobilise finance in inter-
national credit markets; the average capital and current account balance in the recent past; 
the country’s degree of openness; the size of foreign currency liabilities in the banking 
system; and the exchange rate regime (e.g. Edwards 2006; Calvo / Izquierdo / Mejía 
2004). Moreover, the amounts needed in past crises might give an indication of the re-
sources needed in possible future crises, although obviously every crisis is different in 
nature and magnitude. This multitude of factors influencing member countries’ suscepti-
bility to crises makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the optimal amount of 
reserves that a financing arrangement should have at its disposal. Nevertheless, considera-
tion of these factors provides a rough guide to the amount needed to ensure effective pol-
icy responses.3 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
An important task of a financing arrangement is to engage in monitoring and analysis that 
are aimed at an early detection of vulnerabilities (ideally to prevent crises), and in the 
event of a crisis, to provide an adequate response. A good understanding of the economic, 
political, institutional and social background of countries is crucial in that respect. To ful-
fil this task, a financing arrangement needs to have timely access to all relevant data, in-
cluding sensitive government data, which would need to be provided by the authorities of 
the member countries. Indicators of data comprehensiveness, timeliness, reliability and 
access granted to others include subscription to the IMF’s General Data Dissemination 
System and Special Data Dissemination Standard; frequency and size of revisions in na-
tional accounts data; and disclosure of the currency composition of official foreign ex-
change reserves. The less open disclosure of information by a country, the more important 
it is that the providers of finance have good access to necessary information. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
To make appropriate use of all available information, and to convincingly present the fi-
nancing arrangement’s analysis to the member countries, a body of highly skilled staff is 
needed. To help prevent crises from occurring or to respond adequately to mitigate the 
effects of an ongoing crisis, well-trained professionals are required that have the analytical 
                                                 
2 Although this goes beyond the scope of this paper, attempts can be made at assessing the probable tim-
ing of withdrawals by considering the correlation of shocks (including terms of trade shocks and finan-
cial shocks) that affect the member countries of a financing arrangement. Machinea / Titelman (2007) 
do this for FLAR. 
3 Attempts to quantify the optimal level of international reserve holdings have been made for individual 
countries, for instance by Olivier / Rancière (2008). 
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capacities and the country- or region-specific expertise that will enable them to estimate 
the size of the financing required and generate adequate policy recommendations. Indica-
tors of a financing arrangement’s analytical expertise are the size of permanent profes-
sional staff; the level of qualification of that staff (e.g., the share of trained PhD econo-
mists); the financing arrangement’s ability to attract top staff; and the international ex-
change with other financing arrangements, international financial institutions and aca-
demic centres of excellence. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
Successful crisis management requires speedy responses. It is therefore important that the 
financing arrangement’s crisis response mechanisms allow quick decision-making and 
approval by the governing authorities so that guarantees can be issued or funds disbursed 
swiftly. This requires a transparent evaluation and approval procedure, clear responsibili-
ties within the financing arrangement for taking decisions. A proxy for a financing ar-
rangement’s speed in responding is the average time taken from the occurrence of past 
crisis situations (or the moment the financing arrangement receives a request for assis-
tance) to disbursement of crisis financing. Where the financing arrangement has no history 
of crisis situations, the institutional procedures for dealing with a country in need can be 
evaluated to assess this criterion. 
(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
For a financing arrangement to be a trusted partner of its member countries, and to be re-
spected by market participants alike, it must be impartial in both its monitoring and policy 
advice in times of non-crisis, as well as in its lending decisions in times of crisis. A financ-
ing arrangement’s policy decisions and advice should be based solely on good economic 
analysis; any interference in or dominance of decision-making by an individual member 
that might have vested interests will tarnish the financing arrangement’s standing and its 
ability to resolve a crisis, and diminish its policy influence. In addition, it may reduce the 
“sense of ownership” of the less influential member countries, which might be important 
not only regarding the commitment to repay a loan but also for the willingness to ask for 
financial support in the first place. The transparency of decision-making procedures and 
the accountability of the financing arrangement’s management are important aspects in 
this context. Further factors that may have a bearing on a financing arrangement’s impar-
tiality include the selection procedure for senior management, the concentration of voting 
power in the financing arrangement’s governance structure, as well as the existence of 
veto rights of single members, which may allow them to block lending decisions or limit 
financing. To be sure, it is the behaviour of a dominant party/dominant parties that is deci-
sive for the well-functioning of a financing arrangement, not the existence of a dominant 
position per se: a strong power or partnership of powers can provide leadership and impe-
tus, helping to better profile a financing arrangement.4 However, to simplify the operation-
alisation of this variable, we assume that the likelihood of inappropriate behaviour in-
creases with dominance. 
                                                 
4 We would like to thank Aldo Caliari for nuancing this point. 
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(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
The issue of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing conditionality attracts disparate 
views. On the one hand, lending conditionality can be useful for ensuring that the debtor 
government addresses the underlying problems of the crisis5 and that the financing ar-
rangement will get repaid. If conditions are to be applied, a financing arrangement needs 
the capabilities to monitor implementation, so that performance can be evaluated to inform 
the release of further tranches. Often, the linking of tranche release to fulfilment of condi-
tions serves as the primary enforcement measure. 
On the other hand, a criticism that has been frequently applied to IMF conditionality is 
that it not only interferes with the member government’s sovereignty, but that in several 
crisis instances conditions were flawed and counterproductive to crisis resolution. More-
over, attaching a string of conditions that need to be negotiated between the financing ar-
rangement and the member country might stand in the way of a swift disbursement of 
funds. Depending on the nature (i.e. short- or medium-term) and the size of funds under 
discussion, and the type of crisis, facilities without stringent conditions might be more 
appropriate and helpful. In evaluating financing arrangements, the approach to condition-
ality and the quality of monitoring and enforcement should therefore be examined with 
these considerations in mind. 
In order to make comparisons between existing financing arrangements, we operationalise 
these criteria by introducing a rating methodology. That is, we rank the six criteria for 
each financing arrangement on a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score describes a bet-
ter achievement of the respective criterion. Wherever possible, the scores are based on 
hard data, such as elapsed time between lending request and lending decision, or available 
funds relative to number of member countries and their potential borrowing needs. In 
practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to assess these criteria for financing arrange-
ments. This might be because a financing arrangement is opaque and the modes of its 
functioning are not openly disclosed or only partially. For some criteria, one thus has to 
use approximations and take into account factors less than ideally warranted. 
For this research, we used facts and hard evidence where available. We examined a wide 
variety of material including, but not limited to, information provided by the financing 
arrangement itself (either publicly accessible through publications or websites or material 
provided to us by the respective financing arrangement), as well as literature on the re-
spective financing arrangements. It is however inevitable that some of the scores are based 
on our judgement of how different financing arrangements compare with each other. A 
criterion like “impartiality in lending decisions”, for instance, unavoidably has to be ap-
praised based on our understanding of the context of each financing arrangement. The 
comparison is obscured also because of the different forms of the respective financing 
arrangements. To ensure that our judgments are as objective as possible, we have dis-
cussed them with people who either work/ed for the respective financing arrangements or 
otherwise have been closely involved in their work, either academically or as practitio-
ners. Although the judgements are inevitably subjective and in some cases controversial, 
we believe that they should nevertheless provide a good indication of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the respective financing arrangements. 
                                                 
5 With respect to the IMF the argument has been often made that one of its role is that of a “bad cop”, 
meaning that it shall take on the blame for harsh policy measures taken by the member government, 
which were “forced” by the Fund to implement these policies. 
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Having discussed the criteria for optimal financing arrangements, we now turn to an 
analysis of how the IMF fulfils these criteria. 
2.2  Criteria applied to the IMF 
(i) Size of the financing pool 
Over the past years, the Fund’s resources were often judged to be insignificant compared 
to the amount of private capital flowing in the world economy (e.g. Buria 2006; Lachman 
2006). IMF analysis confirms that the relative size of the Fund had fallen substantially 
against various relevant economic and financial metrics for the global economy since the 
IMF’s last general quota increase in 1998 (IMF 2009a). As can be seen in Table 1, the size 
of IMF funds at the beginning of 2009 remained much below its previous levels in relation 
to global output, trade and capital flows. This promted questions as to whether the IMF is 
sufficiently equipped to meet potential demand for IMF financing, a discussion which 
some considered to diminish confidence in the IMF’s ability to carry out its lending man-
date. However, recent developments, not least the decisions taken by the G-20 leaders in 
April 2009 to increase the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and in the meanwhile to 
provide bilateral funds to beef up the available resources for lending, have led to a consid-
erable boost of the Fund’s resources and lending capabilities. In addition, the IMF mem-
bership has agreed to advance the next quota review, which is likely to lead to a consider-
able increase of the quota-based resources. 
The amount that the IMF has readily available for new (non-concessional) lending is 
indicated by its one-year forward commitment capacity. This is determined by its usable 
resources, plus projected loan repayments over the subsequent twelve months, less the 
resources that have already been committed under existing arrangements, less a precau-
tionary balance. As of April 2010, the Fund’s one-year forward commitment capacity 
was SDR 163 billion, i.e. about USD 248 billion (IMF 2010a), which encompasses both 
quota-based resources and borrowed resources stemming from bilateral loans or notes 
programmes made available by several Fund members since 2009.6 
In addition, in the event of unexpectedly large needs, the Fund can activate supplementary 
multilateral borrowing arrangements. The first and principal resort is the NAB, established 
in 1998, under which 26 countries agreed to lend SDR 34 billion (about USD 51.8 billion 
in April 2010). Alternatively, the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), established in 
1962, enables the IMF to borrow up to SDR 17 billion (about USD 26 billion) from 11 
industrial countries. The NAB and GAB cannot be used cumulatively, i.e. the maximum 
amount currently available to the IMF is SDR 34 billion (IMF 2010b). Following up to the 
London Summit on 2 April 2009 the Executive Board in April 2010 adopted a proposal on 
an expanded and more flexible NAB, by which the NAB would be expanded to SDR 
367.5 billion (about USD 588.6 billion), which includes also 13 new participating 
countries. The expanded NAB will become operational after domestic approvals by the 
participating countries. Once the expanded NAB becomes operational, the bilateral loan 
and note purchase agreements will expire. 
                                                 
6 SDR stands for Special Drawing Rights. 
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Table 1: Size of the IMF and economic indicators 
 
Se-
venth 
Review 
1978 1/ 
(1) 
Eighth 
Review 
1983 1/ 
(2) 
Ninth 
Review 
1990 1/ 
(3) 
Tenth 
Review 
1995 1/ 
(4) 
Ele-
venth 
Review 
1998 1/ 
(5) 
Twelfth 
Review 
2003 1/ 
(6) 
Thir-
teenth 
Review 
2008 1/ 
(7) 
Post 
Quota 
and 
Voice 
Reform 
2/ (8) 
Size of Quota Increase, in Percent 50.9 47.5 50.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 
1. Size of the Fund 61.1 90.0 135.2 146.1 212.0 213.7 217.6 238.3 
Index (1998=100)  28.8 42.4 63.8 68.9 100.0 100.8 102.6 112.4 
2. Economic Metrics (Index: 1998=100) 
 a. GDP  33 52 77 88 100 120 177 177 
 b. Trade  26 42 64 82 100 132 258 258 
 c. Capital Inflows 3/ 10 16 37 58 100 143 242 242 
 d. Capital Inflows to EMDCs 3/ 26 28 41 119 100 138 527 527 
 e. Foreign Assets plus Liabilities 4/ 9 19 47 65 100 165 311 311 
 f. Foreign Assets plus Liabilities 
  EMDCs 4/ 10 28 45 74 100 139 304 304 
3. Ratio of line 1 to line 2 (Index) 
 a. GDP  86.8 82.1 83.3 78.0 100.0 84.0 58.0 63.6 
 b. Trade  108.9 100.3 99.4 83.7 100.0 76.1 39.8 43.6 
 c. Capital Inflows 3/ 299.5 258.4 172.2 118.0 100.0 70.5 42.4 46.5 
 d. Capital Inflows to EMDCs 3/ 110.9 149.2 154.4 58.1 100.0 72.8 19.5 21.3 
 e. Foreign Assets plus Liabilities 4/ 322.0 218.7 136.7 105.7 100.0 61.0 33.0 36.2 
 f. Foreign Assets plus Liabilities  288.0 153.7 143.1 93.4 100.0 72.3 33.7 37.0 
Notes: 1/ Quotas approved under each review. Economic data based on the year the Board of Governor’s 
  Resolution on quota review was approved. 
 2/ 2008 data is used. Quotas as agreed under the Board of Governor’s Resolution No. 63-2. 
 3/ Based on three-year moving average for overall capital inflows. Projections based on World 
  Economic Outlook October 2008. 
 4/ Data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti. Figures for columns 7 and 8 based on latest data for 2007. 
Source: IMF (2009b, Table 1) 
As a further response to the financial crisis, the normal lending access limit for member 
countries was doubled in spring 2009 from 100% to 200% of their quota annually. At the 
same time, the cumulative access limit to nonconcessional lending was doubled to 600% 
of quota.7 The higher limits aim to give confidence to countries that adequate resources 
will be accessible to them to meet their financing needs. 
                                                 
7 Lending above the access limits has been possible since the inception of the Fund, and since the early 
1980s was exercised under the exceptional circumstances clause. The nature of the exceptional circum-
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Although the global financial and economic crisis is still ongoing at the time of writing, a 
preliminary assessment would lead us to conclude that the IMF has been able to respond 
adequately so far, with lending commitments reaching a record level of more than USD 
167 billion in April 2010 including a sharp increase in concessional lending to least devel-
oped countries. Taking into account the IMF’s historical track record in lending, and the 
commitments made by the G-20 to expand the Fund’s resources and triple its lending ca-
pacity to USD 750 billion, we rate this criterion with 9 out of 10. 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
According to Art. IV of the Articles of Agreement, member countries are obliged to pro-
vide adequate information to the IMF in order for the Fund to be able to exercise firm sur-
veillance. Regular staff visits to the country are part of the Fund’s routine surveillance. In 
addition, the IMF often has country representatives to ensure a steady exchange with the 
member governments, but also with civil society and academia in the respective countries. 
All this assures a constant flow of relevant information to the Fund.8 
The Fund is widely recognised as a major collector and provider of economic intelligence, 
and as such the IMF fulfils this role reasonably well. The Fund, however, is restricted to 
the information the member countries are willing to provide, and in case the interests of 
the Fund are not identical with those of the member government – which might give prior-
ity to satisfying the domestic constituency instead of following the IMF’s recommendation 
etc., it might not access all information that it would ideally receive. The Fund’s strength, 
in terms of data, is in providing standardised data across its membership. At the same 
time, its depth of knowledge and speed of access to relevant information for any one coun-
try is resource-constrained and may not on the whole be as intimate as desirable (for for-
mulating a programme) owing to its outsider status. We thus rank the IMF with an 8. 
                                                                                                                                                   
stances that would allow access above the limits was left deliberately unspecified. When the exceptional 
access policy was established, the Board deliberately retained the option to grant exceptional access in 
situations other than capital account crisis making recourse to the exceptional circumstances clause. In 
such cases the procedures for exceptional access described above continue to apply, and the request has 
to be judged “in light of the four substantive criteria”, but the approval of the request would not neces-
sarily be conditioned on meeting those criteria. The annual limit applies to gross purchases under the 
credit tranches (normally through a Stand-By Arrangement-SBA) or the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
in any 12-month period. The cumulative limit applies to credit outstanding, less scheduled repurchases, 
plus scheduled purchases, over the period of commitment of resources. In September 2002, the Execu-
tive Board agreed that the policies on exceptional access needed to be strengthened to ensure that such 
access remains exceptional. Four criteria were laid down that would need to be met to justify excep-
tional access for members facing a capital account crisis: (i) the country is experiencing balance of pay-
ments pressures on the capital account resulting in a need for Fund financing that cannot be met within 
the normal limits; (ii) a high probability that debt will remain sustainable established on the basis of a 
rigorous and systematic analysis; (iii) good prospects for the member to regain access to private capital 
markets within the time Fund resources would be outstanding; and (iv) a strong adjustment programme 
adopted by the member that provides a reasonably good prospect of success, including not only the 
member’s adjustment plans but also its institutional and political capacity to deliver that adjustment. In 
addition, the Board agreed on strengthening the procedures for decision-making to provide additional 
safeguards and enhance accountability. 
8 The extent to which timely access to relevant information helps prevent a crisis is the subject of a peren-
nial debate. In this context, it is worth recalling that a recent report by the Independent Evaluation Of-
fice (IEO 2009) found evidence of relatively less effective surveillance of advanced and large emerging 
market economies, despite greater divulgence of information.  Moreover, Lombardi and Woods (2008) 
argue that surveillance activities need to be more member driven, less prescriptive and more open to 
peer participation if they are to invite learning and cooperation, and hence become more effective. 
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(iii) Analytical expertise 
The Fund currently employs about 2,600 staff, half of whom are economists. It is gener-
ally acknowledged that the Fund has been able to attract highly qualified professionals. 
The IMF’s Research Department is widely considered to be one of the outposts for re-
search in international finance, comparable with top university departments. The large 
body of professional staff, which frequently visits the member countries and constantly 
follows the developments in their countries of operation, has enabled the IMF to develop 
profound expertise and carry out its mandate. 
Despite this, the Fund has been condemned for its neoclassical focus and inappropriate 
policy advice. For instance, critics have blamed the Fund for giving flawed policy advice 
to Argentina in the run-up to the Argentinean crisis of 2001–02, or wrong policy prescrip-
tions during the Asian crisis of 1997–98 (e.g. Radelet / Sachs 1998; Katz 1999; Stiglitz 
2000). Moreover, the Fund largely failed to identify the accumulation of risks that were 
building up in financial markets and ultimately lead to the global financial crisis of 2008–
09. (The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which has a much smaller professional 
body, in contrast, fared better in detecting and warning of vulnerabilities in the markets. 
Similarly, United Nations (UN) agencies like United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC) repeatedly warned of the discrepancies between increasingly sophisticated 
and dynamic international financial markets and the lack of proper institutional framework 
to regulate them (Ocampo 2010).) Critics of the Fund argue that a large pool of orthodox 
trained PhDs and a lack of internal diversity were a major liability for the IMF and pre-
vented the Fund from spotting the dangers to financial stability arising from weakly regu-
lated, overleveraged financial markets.9 
Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that IMF surveillance produces highly useful 
general reports (such as the World Economic Outlook). The Fund has also proven capable 
of learning from crises and its own mistakes, which became evident in its policy prescrip-
tions during the 2008–09 crisis. We thus proceed on the assumption that, notwithstanding 
this criticism, the Fund strives for the highest analytical standards, and is widely regarded 
as setting the benchmark, albeit until recently predominantly in orthodox economics, by 
which other economics institutions measure themselves. We hence rate the Fund with an 8 
for this criterion. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
The Executive Board agreed to accelerated procedures for the consideration of financing 
requests as part of the Emergency Financing Mechanism in September 1995 following the 
Mexican crisis.10 These procedures were designed to facilitate rapid approval of Fund sup-
port while assuring the necessary conditionality. In terms of timing, the procedures stipu-
late inter alia that once an agreement has been reached with a country on a programme, 
staff would circulate documents to the Executive Board within 5 days, and the Board 
                                                 
9 Ocampo (2010) points out that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the UN had been calling 
for a macro-prudential financial regulatory framework for a decade before it was adopted by the G-20 in 
2008. 
10 See “Summing Up by the Chairman, Emergency Financing Mechanism”, Executive Board Meeting 
95/85, 12 Sept. 1995. 
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would be prepared to consider the request for an arrangement as early as 48 to 72 hours 
later.11 This emergency procedure was invoked in the cases of Korea and Indonesia. 
Notwithstanding these provisions for a swift crisis response, a criticism that has been ap-
plied to the Fund every so often, especially in the evaluation of the IMF’s response during 
the Asian crisis, is that it acted too slowly to combat crises (e.g. Radelet / Sachs 1998). 
Indeed, the Fund’s swift response to the Mexican “tequila” crisis of 1995 with a USD 17.8 
billion standby programme (amounting to 688% of Mexico’s quota in the IMF) that was 
matched with USD 20 billion from the US Stabilisation Fund and USD 10 billion from the 
G-10 (Bordo / James 2000, 33) contrasted sharply with the inert crisis support for Thai-
land, South Korea, and Indonesia. 
The IMF has tried to learn its lessons from the Asian and other crisis. Among other things, it 
established new and more flexible facilities. The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) was 
created in December 1997 to assist emerging market economies facing a sudden loss of 
market confidence, and was designed in such a way to facilitate swift negotiation and im-
plementation. In practice, the emphasis was on accessing amounts above SBA limits rather 
than rapid responses, as recipient countries were all already on SBAs, i.e. with longer-
standing problems. More recently, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) was introduced in spring 
2009 to provide large and upfront financing to pre-qualifying members, that is, those with 
very strong fundamentals and policies.12 As a further response to the crisis the Fund also 
enhanced the preventive angle of its flag-ship SBA facility to provide flexibility in lending 
also to countries that do not qualify for the FCL but need similar “insurance”. Like the FCL, 
the so-called High Access Precautionary Arrangements (HAPAs) provide large financial 
support on a precautionary basis, which can be frontloaded when the need arises. 
The recent attempts at increasing the Fund’s performance in terms of timeliness and speed 
can be expected to increase the overall appeal of IMF lending. While the time from 
agreement to Board approval and disbursement is short – only a matter of days – there is 
little evidence on the time from the request to the agreement. This may be lengthened by 
the competing interests of the needy country (seeking high and rapid access with minimal 
conditionality) and IMF staff (mindful of the need to safeguard resources and secure over-
all board approval). We hence assign a 7. 
(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
The impartiality of the IMF’s staff is to be assumed. However, lending decisions need to 
be approved by the Executive Board, which is criticised in some quarters as being influ-
enced by geopolitical considerations. For instance, there has been criticism of dominant 
US influence to favour some Latin American countries or of EU members supporting 
                                                 
11 In terms of conditionality, the procedures state that the member would need to be ready to engage im-
mediately in accelerated negotiations with the Fund in order to agree on measures sufficiently strong to 
address the problems, that prior actions would be expected and that the member’s past cooperation with 
the Fund would have a strong bearing on the speed with which the Fund could assess the situation. 
12 The SRF was eliminated in the 2009 reforms along with other seldom-used facilities (the Compensatory 
Financing Facility and the Short-Term Liquidity Facility) to simplify the Fund’s lending toolkit. Mex-
ico, Colombia and Poland have so far used the FCL. 
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countries in the region.13 Moreover, an often-made claim is that the Fund’s lending deci-
sions have been partially driven by the interests of the main shareholders. 
Indeed, a major criticism of the Fund is that its governance structure is dominated by the 
US and European countries, which together hold 10 out of 24 Executive Directorships. As 
can be seen from Table 2, the voting rights in the Executive Board are concentrated among 
Table 2: IMF Quota and votes of largest shareholders 
 Quota  Votes  GDP/World GDP
 Millions of SDRs Percent of total Number Percent of total 2007 
USA 37,149.3 17.09 371,743 16.77 25.11 
Japan 13,312.8 6.12 133,378 6.02 7.97 
Germany 13,008.2 5.98 130,332 5.88 6.04 
France 10,738.5 4.94 107,635 4.85 4.72 
United Kingdom 10,738.5 4.94 107,635 4.85 5.10 
China 8,090.1 3.72 81,151 3.66 6.15 
Italy 7,055.5 3.24 70,805 3.19 3.85 
Saudi Arabia 6,985.5 3.21 70,105 3.16 0.69 
Canada 6,369.2 2.93 63,942 2.88 0.03 
Russia 5,945.4 2.73 59,704 2.69 0.02 
Netherlands 5,162.4 2.37 51,874 2.34 1.41 
Belgium 4,605.2 2.12 46,302 2.09 0.83 
India 4,158.2 1.91 41,832 1.89 2.00 
Switzerland 3,458.5 1.59 34,835 1.57 0.01 
Australia 3,236.4 1.49 32,614 1.47 0.02 
Mexico 3,152.8 1.45 31,778 1.43 1.86 
Spain 3,048.9 1.40 30,739 1.39 2.62 
Brasil 3,036.1 1.40 30,611 1.38 2.42 
Korea 2,927.3 1.35 29,523 1.33 0.02 
Venezuela 2,659.1 1.22 26,841 1.21 0.00 
EU 70,403.6 32.38 710,786 32.06 30.78 
Source: IMF quota and votes (as of July 24, 2009) from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#u  
GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2009) 
                                                 
13 The fact that the Fund permitted Latvia in 2009 to retain its currency peg despite a large current account 
deficit and intense market pressure to devalue the lats (in contrast to its advice during the Asian finan-
cial crisis) prompted Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics to re-
mark that the impression given was “not of an International Monetary Fund but a Euro-Atlantic Mone-
tary Fund” (Beattie 2009, 3). 
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a small group of industrialised countries. The five largest IMF shareholders (the US, 
Japan, Germany, France and the UK) hold 38.37% of IMF voting rights. The 27 EU 
members together hold 32.06% of total voting rights. The US and the EU together ac-
count for 48.77%, very close to the simple majority needed for lending decisions. Fur-
thermore, given that many key issues require an 85% majority in the Executive Board, 
the United States – with 16.77% of total votes – effectively has a veto over major Fund 
decisions.14 
While the Fund’s governance structure as such does not imply that lending decisions are 
biased, anecdotal evidence suggests that lending decisions have been politicised at vari-
ous instances in the past and dominated by the major shareholders. The IMF’s Inde-
pendent Evaluation Office criticises that accountability is “probably the weakest aspect 
of IMF governance” (IEO 2008, 7–8), pointing to difficulties induced by “the overlap of 
responsibilities between the Board and Management on the one hand, and between the 
Board and their political principals on the other [which] blurs the line of accountability 
and makes it difficult to identify a set of outputs for which the Board could be held ac-
countable.” Of the Board’s Executive Directors, five serve at the pleasure of an appoint-
ing member, while the remainder are elected for a two year term, with re-election possi-
ble in some constituencies. For management, it was long the practice that the Managing 
Director (who chairs the Executive Board meetings) was European and the First Deputy 
Managing Director was from the US, although this practice is set to be abolished. Given 
that voting shares diverge widely and the Board’s decisions are, at least at times, influ-
enced by political considerations, we opt for a 6. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
IMF conditionality is “aimed at helping member countries solve balance of payments 
problems without resorting to measures that may put national or international prosperity 
in jeopardy while at the same time establishing adequate safeguards for the use of IMF 
resources” (IMF 2009b). A major criticism that the Fund has to live with is that the con-
ditionality it has attached to its lending has been partly excessive and inappropriate. 
Feldstein (1998, 20), for instance, argues that the IMF’s emphasis during the 1990s “on 
imposing major structural and institutional reforms as opposed to focusing on balance of 
payments adjustments” was misguided, and that the Fund “should stick to its traditional 
task of helping countries cope with temporary shortages of foreign exchange and with 
more sustained trade deficits”.15 Buira (2003) criticises that the Fund has expanded con-
ditionality well beyond its core areas of competence in the fields of monetary and fiscal 
policy and issues related to the exchange rate system to also encompass structural 
change in the trade regime, pricing and marketing policy, public sector management, 
public safety nets, restructuring and privatisation of public enterprises, the agricultural 
sector, the energy sector, the financial sector, issues of governance and others in which 
the IMF’s expertise is limited. Saner and Guilherme (2007a, 2007b) maintain that the 
IMF’s use of lending conditionality has stepped beyond its core legal mandate, particu-
                                                 
14 On the role of low-income member countries in the governance of the IMF, see the contributions in 
Boughton / Lombardi (2009). 
15 Such conditionality, in the past an essential part of the IMF’s mode of operations, has also been severely 
criticised by the International Financial Institutions Advisory Committee, also known as the Meltzer 
commission (Meltzer 2000). 
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larly causing harm to the least developed countries’ economic development, for example 
by dictating their trade policies. 
Against the backdrop of the continuing debate over the use and effectiveness of struc-
tural conditions, the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) undertook an evalua-
tion of the use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programmes (IEO 2007), 
which focused on the effectiveness of structural conditionality at bringing about lasting 
economic change and the impact of the IMF’s 2000 Streamlining Initiative to achieve 
greater focus in the use of conditionality in Fund arrangements. The study found that a 
significant number of structural conditions are very detailed, not obviously critical, and 
often felt to be intrusive and to undermine domestic ownership of programmes. Accord-
ing to the IEO, it was not evident why so many conditions, and at such a level of speci-
ficity, are needed to bring about the desired long-lasting reforms. The IEO also high-
lighted that compliance with structural conditionality, which stands at about 50%, is low 
compared to about 85 percent for macroeconomic conditionality.16 It therefore concluded 
that it is difficult to see how structural conditionality contributes to ensuring adequate 
safeguards for the use of IMF resources or how it provides assurances to borrowing 
countries regarding the conditions under which the Fund’s resources would be available 
to them. 
In March 2009, the IMF modernised its conditionality framework as part of the reforms 
of its lending toolkit. The declared aim is to tailor structural conditions to member 
countries’ different policies and backgrounds. This is to be achieved by using pre-set 
qualification criteria under the FCL and making traditional conditionality more flexible. 
In particular, monitoring of structural reforms is now conducted fully in the context of 
programme reviews, with the use of structural performance criteria discontinued in all 
IMF arrangements, including those for low-income countries. The newly introduced 
FCL for pre-qualified member countries allow for a quick disbursement of funds with 
hardly any strings attached. In line with this new approach, the conditionality, attached 
to recent Fund rescue programmes in the global financial crisis have been remarkably 
light.17 
Although the Fund may not always have been the best at tailoring conditionality, the IMF 
has the capability and resources to monitor the enforcement of its lending conditions. The 
use of performance-based tranche release serves as a reasonably effective enforcement 
mechanism, despite the scope for waivers. We hence rank the IMF with an 8. 
In sum, figure 1 displays the scores for the respective criteria for the IMF in a spider web 
chart. In the following analysis of RFAs, we will use this chart to compare their perform-
ance with the IMF’s.  
                                                 
16 Regarding the effectiveness and enforcement of Fund conditionality, Buira (2003) highlights that the 
rate of member countries’ compliance with Fund-supported programmes showed a parallel and remark-
able decline as the number of conditions, particularly structural conditions, increased gradually during 
the 1980s, and rapidly during the 1990s. 
17 As the IMF’s managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn recently said, the use of conditionality at-
tached to IMF loans has become more focused on “fixing the crisis, not fixing the world” (The Econo-
mist 2009). 
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3  How do regional pooling arrangements compare? 
We now turn to an assessment of various existing RFAs. Among the most advanced and 
established RFAs are the European Union’s Medium-term Financial Assistance (MTFA) 
Facility and the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA). We also scrutinise the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) that was launched in 2000 by 13 East Asian countries; the 
Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), which was created in 1978 (then under the name 
of Andean Reserve Fund-FAR) and today has six member countries; as well as the Arab 
Monetary Fund (AMF), which was founded in 1976 and which today has 22 member 
countries in the Gulf region. 
3.1  Financial assistance in Europe: Medium-term Financial Assistance (MTFA) 
Community instruments to deal with balance of payments problems were established in 
the early stages of European integration. The relevant Article 143 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provides that if a member state is in “serious difficul-
ties or is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments” and if 
such difficulties could “jeopardise the functioning of the common market”, the Commis-
sion shall recommend to the Council the granting of mutual assistance and appropriate 
methods. Article 143 does not define the instrument to be used. 
Two facilities were established in the 1970s, i.e. the MTFA of 1971 and the Community 
loan mechanism which was established in 1975. In 1988, the Economic and Financial Af-
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fairs (ECOFIN) Council merged these two instruments into the MTFA. Moreover, 
whereas beforehand both member states and financial markets could be used to source 
financing for the facilities, the MTFA now relies solely on financial markets.18 
The MTFA was originally designed for all member states of the European Commu-
nity/Union. Since 1999 the facility is restricted to non-euro area member states only, that 
is, its members are all EU member countries which have not adopted the euro (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom). 
The predecessors of the MTFA extended eight loans to member states between 1974 and 
1993. The last loan in that period was granted to Italy in 1993. Since 1993, the MTFA 
remained unused until the outbreak of the global financial crisis (see below).19 
In case funds are needed for liquidity support, the Commission borrows resources from 
the market and makes them available to a member state in the form of loans. The MTFA 
may be implemented by the Council at the initiative of the Commission or of a member 
state experiencing or threatened by balance of payments difficulties. The Council de-
cides whether to grant a loan, its amount, the duration and the conditionality. The Com-
mission is empowered on behalf of the EU to contract borrowings on capital markets or 
with financial institutions, while the European Central Bank (ECB) makes the necessary 
arrangements for the administration of the loans. The Commission together with the 
Council also monitors the implementation of the economic policy measures. Loans may 
be granted as consolidation to the support made available by the ECB under the Very 
Short Term Financing Facility (VSTF). 
In light of recent experience, there have been additions to the lending framework to 
cover also euro area members. When a euro area member encountered solvency difficul-
ties in 2010, EU members responded with loans for that country. Greece received bilat-
eral loans totalling EUR 80 billion augmented by IMF lending of EUR 30 billion. Fol-
lowing this development, the European Council agreed on 9 May 2010 to set up a Euro-
pean Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) for the support for all member states, 
which increases the remaining amount available under the MTFA to EUR 60 billion, and 
represents a modification of it. In addition, euro area members agreed to set up a special 
purpose vehicle – the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) - specifically for 
other euro area members in need, given the collective interest in preserving the stability 
of the euro. With these two additional facilities, all EU members – whether euro area or 
non-euro area – now have recourse to EU finance under pre-defined circumstances, and 
envisage IMF co-financing. In this section, we continue to focus on the MTFA, since the 
operational specifics of the EFSF are still in formation. 
                                                 
18 The relevant Council Regulation to date is the one adopted in 2002, which was amended twice – in 2008 
and 2009 – to increase the ceiling for outstanding amounts to member states. 
19 Every three years the ECOFIN Council has to assess whether the facility still meets the need which led 
to its creation. The first review took place in October 2005, when the ECOFIN Council on the basis of a 
Commission report and an Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) opinion was of the view that the 
principle and underlying rationale of the facility remain valid although the facility had not been acti-
vated since the adoption of the 2002 Regulation.  
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(i) Size of the financing pool 
Until 2008, the maximum amount of loans to be granted to member states under the 
MTFA was limited to EUR 12 billion. In December 2008, this ceiling was increased to 
EUR 25 billion. The relevant Council Regulation argued that the large number of Member 
States currently outside the euro area affected the potential demand for Community assis-
tance and therefore called for a significant increase of the ceiling. As a further response to 
the global financial crisis, the ECOFIN Council in May 2009 agreed on an additional 
enlargement of the MTFA ceiling to EUR 50 billions. The new EFSM for all member 
states, which is a modified MTFA, increases the amount that remains available for bor-
rowing to EUR 60 billion and presumes that beneficiaries will also obtain an IMF loan. 
(The EFSF for euro area members has a total limit of EUR 440 billion, which the IMF is 
expected – but not legally obliged – to support by offering an additional 50% or more of 
the amount made available under the euro area facility.) 
As of April 2010, three countries had been granted access to the MTFA: Hungary EUR 
6.5 billion (November 2008), Latvia EUR 3.1 billion (January 2009) and Romania EUR 5 
billion (May 2009). That is, EUR 14.6 billion out of the total amount available under the 
MTFA have been used. (Note that EU assistance has always been part of international 
packages which included loans from the IMF and the World Bank, plus sometimes loans 
from the EIB, the EBRD and bilateral sources.)20 
The new EFSF makes available EUR 440 billion for euro area members only which, com-
bined with the 60 billion from the EFSM, brings the total available to EUR 500 billion, 
excluding the special loans of EUR 80 billion to Greece.) Against this background, we 
rate the amount that can currently be made available with an 8. 
(ii) Access to relevant information 
Given the regular surveillance activities at the Community level in the context of Euro-
pean economic policy coordination, the Commission has detailed access to member states’ 
economic and financial information. The Member State seeking assistance has to discuss 
with the Commission an assessment of its financial needs and submit a draft adjustment 
programme. Therefore, we consider that access to relevant information should not pose an 
obstacle for an efficient use of the European arrangement, although one can of course 
never rule out data problems, including false reporting. We hence rate the European ar-
rangement with a 9. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
The Commission is well-staffed, and the workforce is generally perceived as well-
qualified. The same applies to staff at the ministries of finance and ministries of econom-
ics and central banks, including the ECB, that are preparing ECOFIN decisions. At the 
same time, European officials conduct such analysis less frequently than the IMF, which 
would suggest that the IMF has the edge. We therefore assign a 7. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
The recent crisis experience and the swift response of the ECOFIN Council and disbursal 
of MTFA support shows that decision-making in a pre-defined framework is relatively 
fast. We therefore assign an 8 for this criterion. 
                                                 
20 According to the Council Regulation, a Member State calling upon sources of financing outside the 
Community, which are subject to economic policy conditions, must first consult the Commission and 
the other member states in order to examine the possibility available under the Community MTFA. 
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(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
While the influence of special historical, political or economic links within a subgroup 
cannot be ruled out, it is to be expected that all EU member countries have an equally 
strong interest in preventing a balance of payments crisis in any of the fellow member 
countries which could lead to contagion effects across the region. Given the close relations 
among EU members, assistance is likely to be granted even where the risk to the region is 
minimal, provided the member in difficulty is committed to undertaking the necessary re-
forms. Therefore, we assume that lending decisions will not be unduly swayed by a minority 
within the EU, rendering lending decisions relatively impartial. We therefore assign an 8. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
Access to all three arrangements is subject to conditionality. Specifically for the MTFA 
(the only arrangement so far used), the regulations state that the Council shall decide the 
economic policy conditions with a view to re-establishing or ensuring a sustainable bal-
ance of payment situation. The Commission shall take the necessary measures to verify at 
regular intervals, in collaboration with the ECOFIN, that the economic policy of the mem-
ber state in receipt of a Community loan accords with the adjustment or back-up pro-
gramme and with any other conditions laid down by the Council. To this end, the member 
state places all the necessary information at the disposal of the Commission which, after 
the ECOFIN Committee has delivered an opinion, decides on the release of further instal-
ments. Although the monitoring capacities as well as the means the Commission has at its 
disposal for enforcing conditionality through the Community budget would suggest a high 
score, there are numerous examples of peer group pressure and rules and procedures fail-
ing in the EU (e.g. in maintaining fiscal discipline). Hence, we rate this lower with a 6. 
Figure 2: Criteria applied to MTFA 
 
Source: Authors 
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3.2  The North American Framework Agreement (NAFA) 
The North American Framework Agreement (NAFA) was established in April 1994 by 
Canada, Mexico and the United States as a parallel financial agreement to the newly estab-
lished North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It is not a formal RFA, but a 
network of bilateral swaps that is designed to provide liquidity support to member coun-
tries’ central banks to avert exchange rate pressure and financial instability in the context 
of increased economic integration under NAFTA.21 
It is noteworthy that in the recent crisis, which was broad-based and did not solely afflict 
North America, the Federal Reserve set up swap arrangements with the Bank of Canada 
and the Banco de Mexico outside the NAFA. On 18 Sept. 2008, the Federal Reserve en-
tered into a swap agreement with the Bank of Canada (as well as a number of other ad-
vanced economy central banks) for an amount of USD 10 billion to expire on 30 Jan. 
2009. This agreement was augmented on 29 Sept. 2009 to USD 30 billion and the expiry 
date shifted to 30 Apr. 2009. On 20 Oct. 2008, the Federal Reserve agreed on a USD 30 
billion swap with the Banco de Mexico (as well as a number of other central banks from 
large emerging market economies). On 3 Febr. 2009, and again on 25 June 2009, the ex-
piry date for all the swaps, including Canada’s and Mexico’s was put back, and they ex-
pired on 1 Febr. 2010. On 9 May 2010, the swap between the Fed and the Bank of Canada 
was revived, along with those of some other advanced economies. 
(i) Size of the financing pool 
The three bilateral swap arrangements add up to just under USD 9 billion. The US-Mexico 
arrangement amounts to USD 6 billion, with the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve con-
tributing up to USD 3 billion each. The Canada-Mexico swap is CAD 1 billion in size, and 
the US-Canada swap amounts to USD 2 billion. The parties to each of the swaps have recip-
rocal rights to draw on the swaps, but the agreements need to be renewed annually. Given 
the size of the economies involved, the amount of emergency financing through these swaps 
is rather negligible. For instance, the amounts available under NAFA proved to be insuffi-
cient during the 1994–95 Mexican crisis and were far exceeded by the magnitude of capi-
tal flows, necessitating a much larger financial rescue package.22 As noted earlier, in the 
recent financial turmoil the Federal Reserve entered into swap agreements with both Can-
ada and Mexico (along with a number of other advanced and emerging market economies) 
for far larger sums outside the framework of NAFA. We thus rate NAFA with a 3. 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
The establishment of a consultative mechanism parallel to NAFA, the North American 
Financial Group, brings together officials from treasuries and central banks to discuss fi-
nancial and macroeconomic developments and policies on an annual basis. This high-level 
                                                 
21 The bilateral swap arrangements among the US, Canada and Mexico predated the creation of NAFA, 
under which they were brought together and enlarged. 
22 Following the initial provision of short-term liquidity by the US and Canada in Jan. 1995, the US-
Mexico and Canada-Mexico swaps were temporarily augmented by 50%, but the additional liquidity 
was not drawn in the end and the short-term NAFA swaps were replaced by much larger medium-term 
loans from the US Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF, exceeding USD 50 billion. This 
allowed the NAFA swaps to be fully reversed by Jan. 1996. 
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exchange is complemented by an exchange of timely information, so that we rate NAFA 
with a 9. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
The participants in the NAFA and the staff of their respective institutions comprise high 
quality talent with a sound level of professional expertise. The size of the human resources 
is unclear as they are drawn from member governments, and is likely to vary depending 
on the importance of prevailing NAFA issues, but can be expected to be sufficient if not 
ample. For this reason we rate this criterion with an 8. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
NAFA swaps are activated by approval of both sides to a transaction. On the side of the 
US, the funds have to be activated by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal 
Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve, which formally controls the activation of 
all Fed swaps, respectively. Depending on the size of the swap approved, there may be no 
conditionality, which simplifies the approval process. Yet even for large sums which re-
quire greater evaluation and negotiation, the experience during the Mexican crisis suggests 
that decision-making is fast. We assign a 9. 
(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
Because lending decisions are taken at the highest political level, and the political power 
of three countries is unbalanced, lending decisions are likely to be influenced by consid-
erations that go beyond purely technical analysis. At the same time, the relatively small 
amounts involved, the small number of parties to the agreement, and the high degree of 
integration of Canada and Mexico with the US, makes for aligned interests, which can be 
expected to support swap decisions, and downplay the importance of the concentration of 
power. We hence rate NAFA simply with a 6. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
The provision of liquidity is not subject to formal conditionality or linked to a Fund-
supported programme. However, the requirement of activation by mutual agreement effec-
tively gives the creditor country the ability to insist on conditions for disbursement. In 
particular, participation by the US Treasury, which in practice establishes the conditions 
for activation on the US side, requires repayment assurances. For instance, when drawing 
on its Exchange Stabilisation Fund, as done during the peso crisis in January 1995, the US 
Treasury required that an assured source of repayment is identified and that the IMF man-
aging director provides a letter stating his confidence in the economic policies of the bor-
rower (Henning 2002). There are, however, no standardised criteria against which assur-
ances of repayment are measured. We hence assign a 7. 
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Figure 3: Criteria applied to NAFA 
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3.3  The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) 
The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) was founded in 1976 and started operations in 1977. It 
has 22 member countries.23 The AMF aims at contributing to the achievement of the fol-
lowing objectives: (i) correcting disequilibria in the balance of payments of member 
States; (ii) striving for the removal of restrictions on current payments between member 
States; (iii) establishing policies and modes of Arab monetary co-operation; (iv) rendering 
advice, whenever called upon to do so, with regard to policies related to the investment of 
the financial resources of member States in foreign markets; (v) promoting the develop-
ment of Arab financial markets; (vi) paving the way towards the creation of a unified Arab 
currency; and (vii) promoting trade among member states. It has a formal structure, with 
several elements adopted from the IMF. In the period from its establishment to end 2009 it 
made 146 loans benefiting 14 countries for a total value of USD 5.6 billion, of which 
around three-quarters was balance of payments related. In 2009, the AMF made two loans 
for stabilisation purposes, totalling around USD 140 million, the largest amount since 
2001. It is interesting that several of its members are among the world’s largest gas and oil 
producers, implying that most of these countries are not likely to experience balance of 
payments difficulties. Rather, the most vulnerable members are the net energy importers. 
This diversification of membership ought to promote confidence in the AMF to be able to 
offer the support needed. 
                                                 
23 Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, 
Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen and Como-
ros. 
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(i) Size of the financing pool 
From the outset, the AMF’s resource pool was limited, which precludes it from financing 
a large share of the balance of payments needs of member countries. This was reflected in 
the articles of agreement in its approach to making the AMF a complementary rather than 
a principal source for financing those deficits. As of December 2009 the paid-up capital of 
the AMF stood at AAD 596 million (of a total authorised capital of AAD 600 million) 
(AMF 2009), that is, roughly USD 2.8 billion.24 It does not borrow. There are two types of 
facilities offered by the AMF, one for balance of payments needs and one for structural 
adjustments. We focus on the former,25 of which there are four types; the automatic loan 
(granted up to 75% of paid-in capital); ordinary loans (granted up to 100% of paid-up 
capital and combinable with the automatic loan to reach 175%); extended loans (granted 
to 175% of paid-up capital and combinable with the automatic loan, to reach 250%) and a 
compensatory loan (up to 100% of paid-in capital). That is, the maximum amount that can 
be borrowed from the AMF by any member under normal circumstances is 250% of paid-
in capital. Although there is no formal link to IMF lending, countries in receipt of ordinary 
and extended loans are expected to withdraw their reserve tranches from “similar regional 
and international organisations”. In addition, in 2009, the AMF approved a new short-term 
liquidity facility, up to 100% of quota, designed to provide resources to countries with a 
good track record but having difficulty accessing financial markets due to global crises. 
On this basis we rate the AMF’s financing capabilities with a 5. 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
The AMF maintains close relations with member countries, which provide the AMF with 
timely access to relevant information and a comparative advantage over the IMF when it 
comes to knowledge of regional economics and politics, so that we rate the AMF with a 9. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
The AMF has a technical staff of around 50 out of a total staff of around 100. Staff are 
well-trained and conduct reviews of financing needs reasonably frequently, but are rather 
stretched for resources that can be devoted to country coverage. We therefore rate the 
AMF with a 7. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
The AMF has a number loan types that vary in the speed of processing. The fastest type is 
the automatic loan, which is without conditionality and can be granted up to a maximum 
of 75% of paid-up capital. A country in need applies by letter, a quick internal report is 
prepared and management takes the decision, with later notification to the Board. The 
other two main types (the ordinary loan and extended loan) take longer to set up. Once a 
country has appealed for assistance, a mission is sent, a programme devised, a letter of 
intention produced by the authorities and submitted to the Board for consideration. This 
process can take between one and six weeks as a rule. These two approaches to granting 
finance provide countries with some assistance swiftly. For this reason, we assign a 9. 
                                                 
24 The Arab accounting dinar (AAD) is the accounting unit of the Arab Monetary Fund and is equal to 
three IMF special drawing rights. 
25 Between 1998 and 2009, loans for balance of payments assistance amounted to 35% of total lending. 
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(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
The AMF’s lending activity is governed by lending policies and procedures consisting of a 
body of rules, regulations and procedures. The lending policies and procedures enunciate a 
number of fundamental basis and principles which the AMF must take into consideration 
in discharging its lending function, such as the principle of fairness and the equal opportu-
nity of access to AMF’s loans by Arab countries. There are eight voting seats on the 
Board, of which three are single seat. These three are Saudi Arabia with 13.58%, Algeria 
and Iraq, each with 11.96%, and their combined shares (at 37.5%) are lower than their 
contributions to subscribed capital (40.8%). Of the five constituencies, the voting shares 
range from 7.05% to 19.96%. On the one hand, the explicit and formal framework of the 
AMF, and attempt to shift from basing voting shares strictly on contributions to paid-in 
capital are indicative of efforts to limit the scope for undue influence on Board decisions. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that three out of the 22 member countries nevertheless 
hold over one-third of the voting rights, which is quite a high concentration. Hence, we 
rate the AMF with a 6 for this criterion. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
The AMF is required to ensure that the resources it lends are used safely by the borrowing 
members who must have the ability to meet their obligations towards it. Automatic loans 
have no conditionality attached, which removes a lever in disbursing tranches. The two 
types of loans offering the largest access to resources (ordinary and extended) require an 
agreement with the borrowing member on appropriate adjustment programmes. In both 
cases, the AMF undertakes consultations aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes in alleviating the member’s balance of payments deficit during the loan’s matur-
ity period. It is evident that quite sizeable sums are recovered with a delay if at all (e.g. the 
2009 Annual Report records USD 214 million in interest set-aside, USD 188 million in 
overdue interest, and USD 140 million in repayments and debt relief). To properly evalu-
ate the extent to which these amounts indicate weak enforcement requires more detailed 
information, such as on the types of loans affected, the countries affected and possible 
security issues of those countries. In the absence of this information it would be inappro-
priate to pronounce on the implications for enforcement. Hence we choose a rating of 7 
based on the procedures in place for monitoring and enforcement. 
3.4  The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) 
FLAR was established in 1978 under the name of Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andinas 
de Reservas, FAR) for the five Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and 
Venezuela). It was renamed into Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) when Costa 
Rica joined in 1989. Uruguay joined in 2008. 
Originally, it was created to provide short-term liquidity support to its members’ balance 
of payments. Besides providing external financing to central banks by granting credit and 
securing third-party loans, FLAR now also engages in improving the liquidity of interna-
tional reserve investments; facilitating the restructuring of public debt; and helping to 
harmonise the members countries’ monetary, exchange and financial policies (e.g. Titel-
man 2006; Eichengreen 2006). FAR was very active in the 1980s, supporting the external 
financing or short-term liquidity needs of Andean countries. Lending has been sporadic 
since then. In 2009, a large loan of USD 480 million was made to Ecuador. 
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(i) Size of the financing pool 
FLAR resources come mainly from the paid-up capital of member countries (about 90%), 
which defines their debt capacity with the fund. In July 2009, members had paid up capital 
of USD 1.77 billion (of USD 2.34 billion authorised capital). These resources are supple-
mented by limited market borrowing. The level of access to credit lines is a function of 
paid-in capital as well as their stage of development. Bolivia and Ecuador are granted 
privileged access to FLAR and can borrow 350% of their capital, whereas other countries 
can use only 250%. The resources FLAR has available for emergency funding might seem 
rather small, but for Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica, their debt capacity with FLAR is 
quite significant and markedly reduces their short-tem debt to international reserves ratio 
when added to their international reserves. In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, FLAR has 
loaned resources equivalent to 35% and 28% of the respective countries’ reserves (Titel-
man 2006, 225). We hence rate this criterion with a 7. 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
The high degree of ownership of FLAR among the member countries and its designated 
role in supporting the coordination of member countries’ macroeconomic and monetary 
policies ensures that FLAR is granted timely access to relevant information so that we rate 
it with a 9. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
Besides its main functions as described above, FLAR also provides technical services, 
training and research services to members’ central banks. When it comes to regional 
knowledge, it has a comparative advantage over the IMF. We thus rate it 7. 
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(iv) Speed of decision-making 
FLAR funding is credited for its timeliness and speed, as well as anti-cyclical crisis 
lending (Titelman 2006; Ocampo / Titelman 2010). In some instances, FAR/FLAR was 
the only institution that provided emergency liquidity, such as during the Peruvian cri-
sis of 1988. Short term lending for emergency liquidity needs – available up to 100% 
of paid in capital – is decided by the Executive President. Other lending decisions, as 
well as conditions and exceptions to access limits for balance of payments and debt 
restructuring credits, are taken by the Executive Board, which consists of members’ 
central bank governors. This lending mode has given FLAR an operational advantage 
over the IMF in the timeliness of credits (Titelman 2006). We hence assign a 9 for this 
criterion. 
(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
Given FLAR’s informal preferred creditor status and the strong sense of ownership 
among the small group of members that is characteristic of FLAR, its governing bodies 
maintain a benign and close relationship with member governments, which runs 
somewhat contrary to the aim of objective and impartial lending. Decisions are mainly 
by 75% majority of those present. Three countries (Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) 
each have 21% of the vote, and a further two (Bolivia and Ecuador) have 10.5%, while 
Costa Rica and Uruguay have 8.9% and 7.1% respectively. This affords the big three 
countries considerable weight in the decision. Indeed, for important decisions, not only 
is a 75% share of the votes of those present necessary, but votes cast against a proposal 
must not exceed 20%. This gives each of the three large countries a veto. We therefore 
assign a 5. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
FLAR has a zero default record in its basic loan operations. Although it has no legal 
status as preferred creditor (where members would have to give priority to repayment 
of their obligations to FLAR over other creditors), it has de facto acquired such a 
status as member countries honoured their obligations even when defaulting to com-
mercial creditors. This (informal) preferred creditor status is also reflected in the rat-
ings of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
FLAR has no conditionality for short-term credits, whereas credits for balance of pay-
ments support are conditional upon economic policy measures as determined by 
FLAR’s Board of Directors. FLAR has no formal link between its own lending opera-
tions and the IMF’s activities, but apparently assessment of macroeconomic perform-
ance by IMF staff has occasionally played an informal role in FLAR’s lending deci-
sions. (It is understood that FLAR can draw informally on the Fund’s surveillance.) 
We hence rate it with a 7. 
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3.5  Regional financing assistance in East Asia: The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
The CMI was launched in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, by the finance ministers 
of the ASEAN Plus Three group (ASEAN+3), which consists of the ten member coun-
tries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as China, Japan 
and South Korea. The idea was to provide short-term financial support for neighbour-
ing countries which experience balance of payments problems. The CMI consists of an 
expanded ASEAN swap arrangement that includes the ASEAN countries and a net-
work of bilateral swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 countries.26 
Between 2000 and 2009, the CMI was developed further and the swap amounts aug-
mented. On 3 May 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed in Bali on the gov-
erning mechanisms and implementation plan for the multilateralisation of the CMI 
(CMIM). That is, the bilateral currency swap agreements will be transformed into a 
single regional pooling arrangement. To date there have been no swaps, or drawings, 
under the CMI since its inception notwithstanding the global financial crisis, not least 
owing to the substantial own reserves of some of the member countries. 
                                                 
26 On the creation of the CMI, see Henning (2002). On the multilateralisation of the CMI, see Volz (2009) 
and Sussangkarn (2010). 
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(i) Size of the financing pool 
The ASEAN swap arrangement is now USD 2 billion in size, while some 16 bilateral 
swap arrangements have been successfully concluded among eight countries with a com-
bined total size of about USD 90 billion. In February 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance minis-
ters held a special meeting in Phuket in light of the global financial crisis and decided to 
increase the funds of the multilateralised CMI to a minimum of USD 120 billion. 20% of 
the funds are to be provided by the 10 ASEAN members and the remaining 80% by the 
Plus Three countries.27 
While the amounts available to potential borrowers under the CMI are small in relation to 
most East Asian countries’ foreign exchange holdings, the available facilities nonetheless 
exceed the region’s less developed countries’ quotas at the IMF by several multiples. (It is 
implicitly understood that the CMI would be drawn upon by the ASEAN countries, not by 
the Plus Three.) It should be noted, however, that the CMI currently operates under the so-
called “IMF-link”, which stipulates that only 20% of the credit lines can be disbursed 
without the borrowing country having a lending programme with the IMF. We hence rate 
the CMI with a 6 for this criterion. 
(ii) Timely access to relevant information 
So far the CMI has had no secretariat or other organisational entity that collects or proc-
esses information, as information was shared directly between governments. It is unclear 
how open the governments are with one another, especially given the historical hostilities 
between some members. Nevertheless, the frequency and coverage of meetings among 
ASEAN+3 has risen markedly over recent years. 
The Bali agreement envisages the creation of a system for regional cooperation that is 
self-governed and goes beyond simple information-sharing or peer-review.28 In particular, 
it entails the creation of an independent regional surveillance agency, the details of which 
were agreed upon by the ASEAN+3 finance ministers at their meeting in Tashkent on 2 
May 2010 (ASEAN+3 2010). The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Surveillance Office 
(AMRO) will be located in Singapore and is supposed to be operational by early 2011. As 
such, the new reserve pooling arrangement under the CMIM – while stopping short of 
being a full-fledged Asian Monetary Fund – should be in a strong position to get timely 
access to relevant information from both the governments of member countries as well as 
financial markets.29 For the time being, however, uncertainties remain about the access to 
data that AMRO will get from its members. In the CMIM negotiations some member 
countries have been apparently reluctant to share all information with the other 
ASEAN+3 countries, and a final agreement still needs to be found in this respect. In-
deed, it is still subject to negotiations whether AMRO will get access to the same data 
                                                 
27 With 32% each, China and Japan both contribute identical shares to the reserve pool. South Korea’s 
share is 16% and ASEAN’s 20%. To arrive at equal contributions by China and Japan, China’s share 
comprises the contribution of Hong Kong, which will now join the CMI. China and Japan hence share 
joint leadership, while the smaller countries gain a larger weight in the governance structure of the CMI 
compared to their relative economic size. 
28 As such, the multilateralised CMI goes far beyond previous initiatives like the Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue that the ASEAN+3 established in April 1999. 
29 The creation of an independent regional surveillance unit was already agreed upon at the ASEAN+3 
summit in Phuket in February 2009. 
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that are provided to the IMF, and it is likely that disclosure of information to AMRO 
will be voluntary initially. On the basis of the current swap arrangements, we therefore 
award a rating of 5. 
(iii) Analytical expertise 
The envisaged regional surveillance agency should improve the level of dedicated pro-
fessional resources and hence analytical expertise available within the CMI, which hith-
erto relied only on those of government officials. Nonetheless, to date AMRO has not 
been established, so that the CMI currently lacks its own expertise and human resources 
to conduct surveillance of regional financial markets and subsequently carry out analyti-
cal research on a level that would match the standards set by the IMF. We therefore as-
sign a 5. 
(iv) Speed of decision-making 
In Bali, the finance ministers agreed on the distribution of voting rights, which are allo-
cated to prevent any of the Plus Three countries, or ASEAN as a group, from holding 
veto power. The types of decision were divided into two categories: fundamental issues, 
which require consensus among all ASEAN+3 countries; and lending issues, which are 
subject to simple majority ruling. As there is no experience with CMI lending so far, we 
can base our assessment only on the procedural structure that would come into force if a 
member country were to apply for assistance. In any case, given that due to the IMF-link 
only 20% of funds can be disbursed without the borrowing country having reached a 
lending agreement with the Fund, the speed of disbursement of the remaining 80% is 
dependent on an IMF decision. This potentially reduces the speed of CMI lending be-
yond the first 20%. We hence rate the CMI with a 7. 
(v) Impartiality in lending decisions 
Given that there has been no CMI lending so far, it is hard to assign a rating for this cri-
terion. Given that no countries in the region have a veto and all have a vested interest in 
preventing a balance of payments crisis in any of their neighbouring countries, which 
could subsequently spill over to the rest of the regional or even the domestic economy, 
we assume that lending decisions should be impartial and assign a 7. This takes into ac-
count the dependency of 80% of loans disbursed on the existence of an IMF programme, 
and so is influenced by the rating of 6 given to the IMF. 
(vi) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier, the CMI currently lacks the expertise and human resources to 
conduct surveillance of regional financial markets, which is one of the reasons why the 
IMF link has been maintained. Once the agreed mechanism for macroeconomic and fi-
nancial monitoring under the CMI becomes fully functional and the CMI has created its 
own monitoring and enforcement apparatus within AMRO, the portion of CMI loans 
that can be disbursed without IMF lending will most likely be increased. For the time 
being, we rate the CMI’s monitoring and enforcement mechanisms with a 7. 
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4  Implications for international monetary stability and the IMF 
Based on our review of how the IMF and the various RFAs fulfil the criteria for optimal 
lending arrangements we can make some tentative observations. 
First, some arrangements bear striking resemblances to the IMF in terms of organisation, 
governance structure, decision-making processes and lending facilities, just on a smaller 
scale. This attests to certain elements being essential for crisis financing, and the quality of 
the model employed by the IMF, notwithstanding its imperfections and lack of appeal in 
some regions. 
Second, the IMF can be described as the best all-rounder, combining a huge body of pro-
fessional staff for analysis and monitoring, as well as (recently increased) resources that 
will enable the Fund to continue to assume a major role as emergency lender worldwide. 
Moreover, the way in which its programmes are designed is conducive to enforcement. 
Third, a comparison with RFAs, however, shows that these also have their comparative 
advantages. In particular, RFAs have potentially quicker access to data, given their prox-
imity to member governments, which in some cases feel a strong sense of ownership of 
the RFAs – something that is notably lacking among the IMF’s developing and emerging 
market economy membership. The Fund, given its outsider status, may not get access as 
quickly as a RFA. Moreover, RFAs can be expected to have superior information about an 
economy in crisis and react more quickly to address the situation. Due to less formalised 
or rigid lending procedures, or the fewer parties involved, RFAs are potentially faster in 
their lending decisions, although the Fund has taken measures to improve in this area, too. 
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On the flipside, RFAs often have at their disposal smaller lending amounts. Compared 
with the IMF, RFAs tend to be less well equipped with technical expertise, albeit this 
might be offset by more detailed regional or local knowledge. Also, RFAs may lack the 
expertise to define the policy course towards external sustainability and the amount of 
funding necessary to reassure markets. 
Fourth, for impartiality in the lending decision, it is not obvious whether the universal 
lender or the regional lender has an advantage, since both leave something to be desired. 
Here, a case-by-case approach is clearly called for. 
The existence and increasingly prominent role of RFAs give rise to a number of issues 
concerning the future and integrity of IMF crisis lending – one of the IMF’s key roles. The 
key question is whether regional arrangements will supplement or supplant IMF lending to 
a country with a balance of payments crisis, and what implications this might have for 
international monetary stability. There are several risks that RFAs pose for international 
monetary stability, as well as benefits. 
Regarding the benefits, RFAs can provide quick support in case of liquidity shortfall in a 
country facing a crisis, which could help prevent a crisis from deepening and spreading. 
Augmenting Fund financing through speedy disbursement by RFAs can help in preventing 
or combating crises. In some cases RFA lending might suffice to ward off a fully-fledged 
crisis; in others it might provide time before a comprehensive programme with the Fund is 
negotiated, i.e. the lending would complement the Fund’s assistance. 
Furthermore, RFAs can help improve a regional policy dialogue and improve incentives 
for strengthened regional cooperation. RFAs can also contribute to global stability by 
promoting a “put your own house in order” strategy at the regional level as well as 
through improving country and regional surveillance. 
Regional peer considerations under the framework of an RFA may better safeguard re-
sources due to a mix of peer pressure, strong sense of ownership and smaller information 
asymmetries at the regional level. To the extent that RFAs do not lend out “other people’s 
money” but the region’s own resources, this might reduce moral hazard problems and cre-
ate stronger incentives to act responsibly in the prevention and management of crises. If 
conditionality is attached to lending, RFAs might be able to convey a stronger ownership 
for necessary reforms. This may be one reason why the suggestion by Hugo Chavez, 
President of Venezuela, for a regional pool to provide unconditional, unlimited access to 
regional finance has not yet come to fruition. 
Last but not least, RFAs might contribute to greater international stability by providing 
alternative approaches to crisis management. That is, a “competition for ideas” between 
the RFAs and the IMF might lead to better overall policies. 
There are, however, also potential risks for stability stemming from a prominent role of 
RFAs. First of all, the lack of distance between lenders and borrower might create a situa-
tion where not enough pressure will be created on the borrowing government to start rem-
edy measures early enough. Governments of crisis countries might be inclined to “condi-
tionality shop”, that is, borrow from the financing arrangement that attaches the weakest 
conditionality to its loan (or none at all). This might lead to a deferment of necessary re-
forms and increase the danger that the crisis will eventually lead to even bigger problems. 
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The danger of conditionality shopping might also increase the risk of moral hazard be-
cause it is easier to tap funds. 
Owing to the greater risk of symmetric shocks among countries of the same region, risk-
sharing gains may be smaller when membership is constrained to a regional basis (Imbs / 
Mauro 2007). (A counter example would be the Arab Monetary Fund, comprising net oil 
importers and exporters.)30 Indeed, regional contagion effects may be too swift and over-
whelm an RFA. Moreover, evaluating the risk and containing potential spillover effects of 
an initially local or regional crisis to other regions might go beyond both the mandate and 
capabilities of an RFA. Since extra-regional externalities that are not adequately addressed 
by an RFA have the potential to cause problems in other regions, the “global public good” 
of global macroeconomic and financial stability might be better safeguarded by an institu-
tion whose mandate is not limited to just one region. Also, a lack of credibility of RFAs or 
too small loan amounts to restore market confidence and a lack of clout with outside pri-
vate sector institutions might backfire and delay crisis resolution. Getting the IMF in-
volved too late might make it harder for both the Fund and the RFAs to deal with a deeper 
crisis. 
Whether RFAs have the potential to replace the IMF as a major international lender, or 
become a serious competitor, ultimately depends on the resources made available to the 
respective RFA. While the large East Asian economies clearly have the resources to trans-
form the multilateralised CMI into a fully-fledged Asian Monetary Fund that would make 
the IMF irrelevant in the region if they wish to do so, the situation appears different for 
other RFAs. An arrangement like FLAR is less likely to be conceived in isolation from 
global arrangements, given the limited resources of its member countries, even though the 
ranks obtained in specific criteria might be high. 
It is quite clear that while RFAs can be constructive in preventing or combating financial 
crises, the main dangers for financial stability arise if an RFA operates against the Fund 
rather than with or alongside it. Whether RFAs will complement the Fund or rather com-
plicate the Fund’s work depends on how they are set up. A healthy competition for sur-
veillance and ideas could well contribute to overall international financial stability. In con-
trast, unhealthy competition – where RFAs erode the Fund’s standing by undermining its 
authority and allowing countries in balance of payments crises to bypass the Fund entirely 
– has the potential to undermine the stability of the international monetary system. Such 
adverse competition carries the danger of leading to a weakening of economic policy mak-
ing standards through conditionality shopping. Undercutting Fund conditionality with an 
insufficiently rigorous economic management and lax lending requirements leaves open 
the risk of crisis exacerbation and contagion (assuming, of course, that Fund conditionality 
is appropriate). 
Constructive competition for the Fund in the provision of crisis financing by RFAs should 
clearly be welcome, while an overt confrontation between the Fund and an RFA should be 
avoided. This points towards the need for clarifying existing lending procedures and a 
division of labour between the Fund and RFAs. Ocampo (2006) makes the case for a divi-
                                                 
30 For Latin America, Machinea / Titelman (2007) show that Chile and Colombia, both of which have a 
low reserve volatility, would not benefit from joining FLAR, since both would experience a decline in 
effective reserves as compared to self-insurance. Other Latin American countries such as Mexico, Ecua-
dor and Peru, in contrast, would benefit from joining FLAR. 
Regional financing arrangements and the stability of the international monetary system 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 31
sion of labour in the provision of financing between global and regional organisations.31 
He proposes a federal network of the IMF and regional arrangements. In particular, 
Ocampo envisages that the IMF should play a central role in macroeconomic policy coor-
dination at the global level, while RFAs should have a greater role on a regional and 
subregional level. While the Fund should manage the largest balance of payment crises to 
avoid regional and global contagion effects, he argues that RFAs could provide full crisis 
support to small and medium countries. 
Like Ocampo (2006) and Henning (2006) demands a clearer division of labour between 
the Fund and RFAs, although he envisages a much more central role for the IMF. In par-
ticular, Henning (2006, 177–8) proposes a set of principles that regional facilities should 
adopt in order to guide their relationship with the Fund. In particular, Henning proposes 
that RFAs should (i) create no substantial conflict with members’ obligations under the 
Articles of Agreement; (ii) be at least as transparent as the financial and monetary rules 
and operations of the IMF; (iii) adopt and pursue sound rules of emergency finance, to be 
understood as lending into liquidity shortfalls (as distinguished from insolvency) at pre-
mium interest rates and with assurance of repayment; and (iv) lend on sound condition-
ality, understood to mean policy adjustments that eliminate the financing gap in the me-
dium term, or link lending to IMF conditionality directly. 
Henning also suggests that IMF member countries engaged in regional facilities should 
agree (i) to report and disclose the details of their regional cooperative arrangements to the 
IMF; (ii) to submit their arrangements to the purview and assessment of the IMF’s Execu-
tive Board; (iii) that regional financial facilities shall not undercut IMF conditionality; and 
(iv) that regional policies with respect to financial regulation and private-sector involve-
ment must be consistent with stabilisation efforts on the part of the IMF. Such or similar 
rules would provide the basis for a successful collaboration between the IMF and RFAs 
and avoid the kind of unhealthy competition sketched out above. It would also be useful to 
assess the adequacy and usefulness of CMI-types of links for coordinating regional and 
global responses, both from the political and economic perspectives. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the potential contribution of regional financing arrangements to 
the stability of the international monetary and financial system. The main conclusion is 
that whether RFAs complement the Fund or rather complicate the Funds work, that is, 
exacerbate or help alleviate crises, depends on their design and operation. To gauge the 
quality of an RFA, we established a set of “optimal financing criteria” relevant for provid-
ing crisis financing using a first principles approach. We then evaluated the frameworks 
for the various regional arrangements in existence against these criteria. Compared with 
the Fund, RFAs in general can be expected to have superior information about an econ-
omy in crisis, and react more quickly to address the situation. At the same time, RFAs 
may not have the expertise to define the policy course towards external sustainability and 
lack the amount of funding necessary to reassure markets. Moreover, there is a danger 
that, instead of being a second line of defence, RFAs might undercut Fund conditionality 
with an insufficiently rigorous economic management and lax lending requirements that 
                                                 
31 See also Culpeper (2006). 
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will leave open the risk of crisis exacerbation and contagion to countries also beyond their 
membership. While a “competition for ideas” that leads to better policies and crisis re-
sponses should be welcome, a competition for the provision of public goods that will per-
versely lead to a deterioration of international monetary stability through conditionality 
shopping must be avoided. In contrast, it would be highly desirable to create or increase 
synergies between the various regional arrangements and the IMF. 
An obvious extension to this work is to examine the growth of and recourse made to bilat-
eral lines for the provision of liquidity, for example, via swap arrangements.32 Why has 
more recourse been made to these than RFAs in the recent crisis? What does this reveal 
about the financing needs of countries, and what do they infer for international monetary 
stability? What gaps are they filling in the “market” for crisis financing; and how to they 
compare with other crisis financing arrangements? 
                                                 
32 See the recent contributions by Aizenman / Jinjarak / Parl (2010) and Obstfeld / Shambough / Taylor 
(2009). 
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